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1 The Internet Society between changing organizational fields
With the formation of a private non-profit corporation providing mainly technical
coordination and guidance for the global Internet, a new, as yet uncertain, era of the
network's governance began in November 1998. The Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) assumed the responsibility for functions which previously
were guaranteed by the US government. Thus ICANN serves as an example of private
governance with global significance, in an industry which can neither be completely left
to the market nor exclusively be governed by national public authorities or international
intergovernmental organizations.
We will touch upon these points in this paper. However, our main focus is on a different
question: Given an increasing salience of private organizations in international
governance, how must a private organization be equipped, or what determines the
opportunities of such an organization to establish itself as an important actor in the new
arrangement of private governance? As the answer to the question is based on a single
case study, we cannot claim general validity for it. The study, however, does suggest a
perspective that places single organizations in the context of a field of organizations and
regards them as one player in a policy domain involving many public and private
organizations. While these organizations differ with respect to their structure, resources,
missions and legitimacy, they create an ecology which may be favorable or unfavorable
to an organization with a given structure and a given aspiration to reach its goals.Our study does not record a success story because it is not focused on ICANN. Rather, the
Internet Society (ISOC), which was formed in 1992 to take responsibility for the fast-
growing Internet, is at the center of our analysis. From its inception this private non-
profit organization tried to establish itself as an international organization. However, the
struggle for recognition both in the international realm and at the national level of the
USA proved to be a tedious, if not altogether futile, task. This is amazing, given the need
for an organization representing the Internet in the arena of international coordination at a
time (the early 1990s) when no serious competitors to the ISOC existed. Although the
composition of states, private organizations and market elements involved in coordinating
the Internet's technology and services has been contentious, this cannot be regarded as the
main reason why the ISOC has experienced difficulties in establishing itself.
One way of explaining these difficulties, we suggest, is by combining the corporate-actor
approach to organizations with the new institutionalism in organization theory. The
corporate-actor approach helps us to understand why the ISOC aspired to position itself at
the international level. The institutional perspective on organizations and organizational
fields directs our attention to both the changing landscape of organizations involved in
regulating and coordinating telecommunications and the emerging Internet complex. The
ISOC's location at the interface of these two distinct organizational fields accounts for
many of the tensions this corporate actor has been facing.
At the time when the ISOC was set up, the international regime that governed global
communication networks was in a state of transition. The core of this regime was the
traditional telecommunications regime. In the 1980s it came under pressure as many
industrialized countries began a process of deregulation and liberalization. National
monopolies were dissolved and competition was introduced. This also affected the
international telecommunications regime, which began to transform itself from a
predominantly intergovernmental arrangement of self-sufficient technical coordination,
interspersed with policies aimed at the protection of national monopolies, into a more
open, less centralized cluster of private and public organizations blending many issues of
technical coordination with strategic business interests. The International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), as the main public actor in the field of international
telecommunications coordination, pursues a policy of multilateral coordination, which is
characterized by its rather tedious processes and technical debates, which in turn always
require a consensus being reached. The ITU has undergone substantial reforms since the
beginning of the 1990s. Nevertheless, its tradition as an intergovernmental organization
determined by the habits of representatives of sovereign nation states has left its mark on
the telecommunications regime.
The Internet has developed apart from telecommunications, as a separate organizational
field. It is a global data network that initially sprang up in the United States, but was not
bounded by national borders. The procedures, norms and membership rules that constitute
the Internet complex of organizations differ fundamentally from those in
telecommunications. This complex has not wanted to be absorbed by the organizations
that traditionally operate, coordinate or regulate networks and services in
telecommunications. Internet coordination is characterized by relatively informal
procedures, open individual and organizational participation, and technically driven
debates aimed at quick, easy-to-implement solutions. Parts of the Internet complex regard
themselves as a "community" of individual and collective actors, and they have
traditionally been in opposition to the telecommunications regime, including the area of
international standardization. However, Internet governance has not yet reached a stable,
mature state. The growing commercial viability and the global significance of thenetwork have induced changes in the governance structure which were influenced by the
ISOC.
In 1992, when the ISOC was created, use of the Internet was no longer confined to its
original domain of education and research, but had expanded into other sectors such as
business and politics, not only in the USA, but increasingly on a global scale. As a result,
the Internet complex could not expect the U.S. government to continue subsidizing and
sheltering the community. Therefore, leading activists of the Internet community set up
the ISOC in order to help consolidate the Internet by taking over some of the
governmental functions and by coordinating the Internet complex with other
organizational fields, chiefly telecommunications to begin with.
Below we show why this has not worked out in the way some of the founding members
of the ISOC hoped it would. We analyze the organization's internal structure and relate it
to the development of the two organizational fields or policy domains between which the
ISOC was torn: the domain of international telecommunications coordination and the
Internet domain (Figure 1). Both fields differ in many respects, but what they have in
common is the fact that they are changing rapidly. Before we turn to these two fields we
should like to briefly introduce the central theoretical concepts.
Figure 1: The Internet Society (ISOC) between two organizational fields
2 Corporate actors and organizational fields
The concept of the corporate actor is rooted in institutional economics, which has
traditionally regarded corporatization as a specific means of concerting individual action
(Commons 1961). In the corporate mode of concerting action, individual actors transfer
rights and resources to act (i.e. power) to an organizational entity, which then acts for the
members (Coleman 1974; 1990). A basic contract between the members as the sources of
power (they are the sovereigns rather than the staff of an organization) and the corporate
actor as the wielder of power is meant to ensure a maximum of conformity between the
corporate actor's actions and the members' preferences. However, the rules cannot
completely determine organizational action. They necessarily provide the corporate actor
with some freedom to act. The results of organized action are usually group products,
which cannot be received by individual members as separate returns, but are distributed
among them according to special rules (Vanberg 1992). The rules are more relevant for
business corporations than for labor unions, and they may be least relevant for those
voluntary associations which produce public goods. On the other hand, as we know from
the theory of collective action, these organizations often have difficulty attracting
members unless they are able to provide selective incentives for membership (Olson
1971).The corporate-actor model approaches organizations from the procedural rules which
organized action is based on. Its specific focus on the internal structure of an organization
distinguishes this approach from other views of organizations. It has inspired a wealth of
literature dealing with internal control as a principal-agent problem. But the consequence
of this approach - attributing actor quality to organizations - has often been neglected.
The corporate actor's goals, interests and preferences are more than, or different to, the
sum of the members' respective features. Corporate actors have what can be called self-
interest, i.e. they have goals such as autonomy, organizational survival, growth and
domain expansion. Their strategic implications and the resulting internal and external
conflicts depend on the institutional environment in which the organizations operate and
only to a minor degree on their internal structure (cf. Scharpf 1997: 51-68). We regard the
ISOC as such a corporate actor. Since its creation the ISOC has developed an interest not
only in promoting the growth of the Internet, but also in establishing itself as a
recognized and powerful actor in the arena of global coordination of the Internet.
Research into the interaction of corporate actors in different policy domains has revealed
that these actors prefer dealing with other clearly structured actors rather than being
confronted with a diffuse conglomerate of fluid constellations of individuals, research
projects, workshops, "movements" etc. (cf. Flam 1990; Schneider et al. 1994). Thus, the
incumbent corporate actors have an interest in the "corporatization" of new collective
actors in their policy domain (Döhler & Manow-Borgwardt 1992; Döhler 1995). This
provides new corporate actors, such as the ISOC in 1992, with a good opportunity -
though no guarantee - for establishing themselves as recognized partners in a policy
domain. To understand the development and behavior of a corporate actor, therefore,
requires including the actor's environment in the analysis rather than concentrating solely
on the internal structure and processes of a single corporate actor. In our particular case,
the ISOC, this means that we should not simply look at its constitution, evolution and
strategy from an internal perspective, but include the ISOC's organizational and
institutional environment and its specific dynamics as well. The ISOC is but one
organization in a population of organizations which regard it as their business to promote
and coordinate global information and communication networks.
The organizations constitute what is called an organizational field in the new sociological
institutionalism of organization theory. DiMaggio and Powell, who introduced this
concept, use it to explain why, as they argue, organizations in a specific line of business
grow increasingly similar to one another. The authors call this phenomenon institutional
isomorphism. Borrowing from population ecology, they describe isomorphism as "a
constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face
the same set of environmental conditions" (DiMaggio & Powell 1991b: 66). Whereas
population ecology in organization theory emphasizes competition as the selective force
that eliminates non-optimal forms and produces organizational similarity in a given
population (Hannan & Freeman 1977), the concept of institutional isomorphism includes
other (institutional) forces that promote similarity. Unlike competition these mechanisms
trigger organizational change without necessarily making organizations more efficient.
Organizations, for example, incorporate institutionalized elements of their environment
because this increases their legitimacy, thereby strengthening support and securing their
survival (Meyer & Rowan 1991).
DiMaggio and Powell distinguish three mechanisms that trigger institutional isomorphic
change. The first is external pressure, e.g. legal obligations, towards similarity (coercive
isomorphism); the second is uncertainty, inducing imitation and copying of successfulorganizational models (mimetic isomorphism); the third is related to the cognitive and
normative base of the professions which shape organizations (normative isomorphism).
These three mechanisms do not provide a complete picture of how institutions affect
organizational structure; other mechanisms need to be included (cf. Scott 1987). The
distinction between institutions and organizations, however, allows DiMaggio and Powell
(1991a: 14) to draw our attention to rules and norms that structure organizations and the
courses of actions of individual and corporate actors (see also Knight 1992: 66 ff.).
DiMaggio and Powell define an organizational field as a set of organizations involved in
a common enterprise and mutually aware of each other. Patterns of coalitions and
structures of domination between organizations characterize such a field, which includes
"the totality of relevant actors" (DiMaggio & Powell 1991b: 64, 65). This understanding
of an organizational field is similar to what has been called a policy domain in political
sociology (see Pappi & Knoke 1991; Kenis & Schneider 1991). The concept of policy
domains, however, puts greater emphasis on agency (actors) and interests than does the
concept of organizational fields, which is restricted to institutions (cf. DiMaggio 1988).
Two organizational fields provide the focus of our analysis: the relatively new Internet
complex and the traditional area of telecommunications. A closer look at the structure of
these fields helps us to understand why it has proved difficult for the ISOC to establish
itself in both fields at the same time.
3 Public and private coordination of global telecommunications
The Internet is a comparatively new phenomenon. While predecessors can be traced back
to the first half of the 1980s, the Internet only started to develop into a global network of
networks in the early 1990s. At that time, the telecommunications sector was in a state of
transition: from a system of highly regulated, nationally controlled networks, providing
telephone and basic data transmission services, to a deregulated competitive system of a
growing number of network operators and services providers, offering a wide range of
voice and data services. While public administrations (PTTs) originally controlled almost
every aspect of telecommunications, the public sphere was pared down to the minimum
by the end of the 1990s, with the result that, today, private organizations can be found
operating networks and providing services (Schneider 1999). Thus, the new national
telecommunications regimes have many features of a market regime, and the
governments' capacities to directly control the sector have been reduced considerably.
Regulatory agencies have been set up, whose central task involves safeguarding
competition, providing open access to networks and ensuring universal provision of basic
services. (For Germany, see Werle 1999a.)
The changes at the national level have also challenged the international
telecommunications regime, which in the past resembled a closed shop in which national
governments or their PTTs almost exclusively controlled the technical and commercial
aspects of international telecommunications (Genschel & Werle 1993). Whenever
international coordination was necessary, it was achieved in the context of the
International Telecommunications Union (ITU), one of the oldest intergovernmental
organizations. The ITU provided technical and operational specifications (standards) as
well as commercial regulations, such as accounting principles, rate sharing, prohibition of
bypass practices and reciprocal monopoly protection (Aronson & Cowhey 1988). The
ITU was the institutional basis for the transnational coordination of international
telecommunications and, at the same time, an arena of national interest representation,which in effect reinforced the traditional regulatory structure to the benefit of the national
monopolies (Cowhey 1990). In the wake of deregulation this system has lost much of its
legitimacy. Accordingly, other international organizations such as the OECD or the WTO
have achieved some leverage in telecommunications as liberalization has become global.
Even technical standardization, a crucial basis of the ITU's legitimacy, is no longer
regarded as a "natural" part of its jurisdiction. This relates to the fact that in the past the
ITU and, to a lesser degree, other standards organizations, such as the International
Standardization Organization (ISO) or the International Electrotechnical Commission
(IEC), managed to combine "pure" technical coordination with an element of legitimate
political control of international standardization (Schmidt/ Werle 1998). While in the era
of public monopolies this arrangement appeared essential to the orderly development of
the global telecommunications system, today many private network operators and service
providers regard it as too rigid and even counterproductive to the promotion of open
markets. As a result, some processes of standardization are simply left to the market,
whereas others have been taken over by new private associations at the regional or
international level. In these consortia and forums the principle of national representation
is obsolete and political arguments are avoided. This does not mean, however, that
technical standardization is "freed" from all non-technical considerations. In private
standardization business and profit motives play a significant role.
Multimedia systems, national and global information initiatives and, of course, the
Internet have increased the need for technical standards. Many new consortia and forums
have been created, while others have extended their domains. It is estimated that their
number exceeds 200 in the computer and telecommunications industry. What these new
units have in common is that they do not aspire in an "imperialistic" way to provide
standards in most areas of telecommunications and information technology. Rather, they
restrict themselves to more specific tasks, often in the context of a certain technology or
technical solution. The consortia and forums mirror the tendency towards a more market-
oriented way of developing and operating technical systems. On the other hand, the new
organization have also copied and only slightly modified the procedural rules, working
methods and other features prevalent at the working level of the ITU and the other public
or quasi-public standardization organizations. However, the appearance of the new units
on the stage of international standardization has put pressure on the incumbents to
improve their working procedures, modify their membership rules and rethink the overall
organization of standard-setting and standard-distribution (David & Shurmer 1996).
At present the consortia and forums co-exist with the ITU and other intergovernmental or
quasi-intergovernmental standardization organizations, which are undergoing institutional
reforms in order to cope with the new industry structure and the resulting coordination
demands in telecommunications. Taken as a whole, the global landscape of technical
coordination and standardization in telecommunications is a mixture of public and private
organizations, which combine technical work with either political or commercial
considerations. Where the organizations' main focus is on telecommunications, the model
of the telephone network, both as a technical system and as a social organization with
specialized (and centralized) network operators, service providers and passive users, has
left its mark on their structure, goals and strategies.
Originally, the process of restructuring the international telecommunications domain was
only marginally affected by the emergence of the Internet. Even though liberalization of
telecommunications provided beneficial conditions for the Internet to take off, there was
no need to deal with the network and its promoters in the context of internationalcoordination of telecommunications. The Internet had its own address space and used its
own set of technical protocols. For a long time it was viewed as an academic network
controlled by the U.S. Government and the Department of Defense. Moreover, no private
organization existed which might be addressed as an acceptable partner at the
international level. Accordingly, no organization "representing" the Internet was among
the stakeholders who played an active role in the process of transformation of the
telecommunications regime. The changes in this regime, however, had to be considered
by the ISOC and other organizations from the Internet domain if they wanted to be
recognized by the incumbent organizations in the telecommunications domain. This
recognition was regarded necessary because the Internet depends on the
telecommunications infrastructure. In particular private households use the telephone line
to connect up to the Internet. The big network operators and service providers who
control the global telecommunications infrastructure have an interest in extending their
control to the Internet (Werle 1999b).
4 The Internet complex and the Internet society
What we today call the Internet has different roots. Some go back to the late 1970s and
early 1980s when in the USA the ARPANET fascinated its academic users and motivated
those academics who had no access to this network to fight to get similar networks
funded (Leib & Werle 1998). With the establishment of the NSFNET in the mid-1980s,
an academic and research network funded by the National Science Foundation, a crucial
step was taken towards setting up a nationwide network of networks. The NSFNET
served as a national backbone to which other networks were connected. The connections
were made possible using protocols on which the well-known Internet protocol suite
TCP/IP came to be based, so that users can now access the Internet as if it were one
single network. Already by the end of the 1980s the first commercial segments were
linked to the Internet. This marked the beginning of a development that is characterized
by commercialization, privatization and internationalization.
Compared with the traditional telephone network, it is evident that the organizational
foundation of the Internet is completely different. No central unit operates and controls
the Internet. Although the functioning of the whole Internet depends on some parts of the
network (the backbone) more than on others (the regional or local networks), its overall
organizational structure is genuinely decentralized: the sub-networks, too, are loosely
coupled. Thus, the Internet embodies a decentralized mode of provision of networks and
services, where few "top-down" and many "bottom-up" elements interact.
The Internet complex as an organizational field and the social and normative order of the
Internet community evolved in the years when the U.S. government funded the essential
technical and organizational elements required to keep the system going. Stressing the
decentralized nature of the Internet does not imply that it has developed in an
uncoordinated way. Especially in the area of technical coordination and standardization, a
number of committees and groups have evolved that ensure operational stability and
direct development. Some vital functions were originally executed by a single, top-level
entity, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), which had to make sure, among
other things, that every host computer on the Internet had a unique address. Despite its
functional importance the IANA was only a small unit in a distributed system relying
heavily on delegation.[1] The central unit of standardization is the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF). The IETF is split into numerous working groups covering eight to ten
functional areas. In the middle of 1999, 118 working groups were active in a total of eightareas. Working groups can be easily created, and most of them are wound up after they
have fulfilled their brief. The groups are managed by area directors. In contrast to most of
the standardization organizations in telecommunications, participation in the IETF and its
working groups is open to virtually anyone. Formal membership is not required, and the
latest IETF meetings were attended by more than 2,000 people. As a rule, participants do
not represent organizations and they are by no means regarded as delegates of their
employer organization or their home country. Much of the work proceeds on-line via
mailing lists, and many of the influential committee members are volunteers from public
and private research organizations with a strong academic or professional interest. They
follow the informal IETF credo "We reject kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in
rough consensus and running code", coined by Dave Clark from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology Laboratory for Computer Science.
A steering body, the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), has been formed by the
IETF Chair and the area directors. The IESG coordinates the activities of the working
groups, assigns group chairs and approves the results of the groups' work. Before
standards are adopted, at least two independent implementations must have demonstrated
that they really work. Moreover, when a standard is proposed, it is published
electronically and at some stage of the standards track it is introduced as a "Request for
Comments" (RFC) in the RFC document series. Thus, a broad and unrestricted discussion
of the proposal is possible via electronic discussion groups and mailing lists. To be
approved as a standard, the draft must be accepted by the IETF and the IESG on the basis
of consensus. Every standard is provided free of charge and published as an RFC.
Until 1992/93, when the standardization procedure was reorganized, the Internet
Architecture Board (IAB) had to give its approval, too. The IAB, an "independent
committee of researchers and professionals with a technical interest in the health and
evolution of the Internet system", as it defines itself, is the highest committee in the
technical or techno-political "hierarchy" of the Internet. Since the 1992/93 reform, it only
becomes involved in the standardization process if conflicts at the working level cannot
be resolved at this level. Members of the IAB are appointed - by way of cooptation - for
a two-year term by an IETF nominating committee. With the network's global expansion,
Internet standards have gained international significance similar to, and in some cases
higher than, those issued by international organizations.
If we compare Internet coordination and standardization with telecommunications,
political considerations - and to a certain degree commercial considerations - appear to be
less prevalent in the Internet community than in the telecommunications field. The
Internet community is committed in the first place to scientific, educational and, above
all, professional objectives.[2] It is noticeable that these objectives are not restricted to
national confines. Although the Internet activities originated in a national (partly even
military) context, many of the relevant actors in the early Internet community had a
global vision. Consequently, people from outside the USA participated in the Internet
committees from the outset. In 1996, only seven out of twelve members of the IAB were
based in the USA. The international shape of organizations which have been very closely
linked to the development of the Internet is both a result of and a reinforcing factor in the
growing global significance of the network[3]. This development, however, has created
challenges for these and other organizations involved in the coordination of the Internet,
because the U.S. government no longer sees a need to provide funds and organizational
assistance to a network that has attracted thousands of firms and millions of users. The
establishment of the Internet Society (ISOC) must be seen in this context.In 1992, the ISOC was formed "by a number of people with long-term involvement in the
IETF" (Cerf 1995: 1), who assumed responsibility for the network. This private non-
profit organization (formally an incorporated not-for-profit corporation) was set up
primarily "to facilitate and support the technical evolution of the Internet as a research
and education infrastructure, and to stimulate the involvement of the scientific
community, industry, government and others in the evolution of the Internet" (Articles of
Incorporation of Internet Society: 3.A, also published as RFC 2134). The ISOC was
supposed to take over certain functions of the U.S. government concerning the provision
of funds and organizational assistance in areas which still depended on these resources.
From its inception the ISOC was not seen as being restricted to the USA (Malamud
1993), although one pressing reason for the creation of the ISOC was to mobilize
resources in order to fund the IETF and other parts of the Internet's administrative
infrastructure, since the U.S. government agencies had started to reduce financial support.
The aim of the ISOC was to act as an internationally recognized body. This is mirrored
in the board of directors (Board of Trustees, BoT) of the ISOC. Already on the initial
board, three out of 14 trustees were from Europe and one from Australia. Later, the
number of non-U.S. citizens in the board increased, reaching 50 % in the boards elected
in 1997 and in 1999. The ISOC is open to individual and corporate membership. In 1999
the society had about 150 organizational members and more than 8,600 individual
members from about 170 countries. The majority of individual members are now from
outside the U.S., and despite this broad range of membership the ISOC has been guided
by a circle of (elected) activists who were also involved in the IETF, the IAB or other
groups functionally significant for the Internet. This network of actors with a high
reputation in the Internet community still has considerable de-facto control over those
issues which are directly linked to the Internet, especially technical and organizational
matters. The activists have in common the conviction that government action is not
needed to provide the public good "Internet coordination" (cf. Eisner Gillett & Kapor
1997) This conviction is also shared by the U.S. government, which since 1995 has
repeatedly declared in official statements that it is committed to a hands-off policy. If
collective rather than market coordination is needed, it should be provided by private
organizations and not by American government agencies or intergovernmental
organizations. Initial activities of the Internet Society aimed at establishing it in the
organizational field of the Internet complex - a precondition for its future goal of also
gaining recognition in the organizational field of telecommunications. The role of the
ISOC vis-à-vis the IAB, the IETF, the IESG and the Internet standardization process had
to be determined. This coincided with a perceived need by these organizations to
reorganize standardization. With growing numbers of IETF working groups and
participants involved in Internet standardization, organizational, procedural and legal
issues arose which threatened to undermine the traditional patterns of standardization and
technical coordination. The ISOC chartered the IAB and sponsored its work. As a
consequence, the ISOC Board of Trustees (BoT) claimed the right to approve new
members of the IAB. In addition, a recall mechanism was planned with the ISOC
providing an ombudsman (see RFC 2282). Also, members of the ISOC BoT expressed
their concern about legal issues, in particular with regard to the legal liability of the
IESG. In the discussions which followed about the role of the ISOC it became evident
that the other organizations did not want the ISOC to become involved in technical
matters. In their view the ISOC was best suited to the role of a supervisor of formal
procedures and a provider of a legal umbrella for the Internet Community. After some
time a consensus was reached along these lines.[4] This indicates that the IETF succeeded
in preventing the ISOC from interfering with its business. It is important to notice that,
during the discussions, the ISOC had to adopt the particular style of debate prevailing
within the Internet community: "The ISOC will, like the IETF, use public discussion andconsensus building processes when it wants to develop new policies or regulations that
may influence the role of ISOC in the Internet or the Internet technical work" (RFC
2031).
The somewhat intricate process used to define the relation of the ISOC and the IETF
exemplifies the ISOC's difficulties in getting established in the Internet complex.
Originally, the ISOC was supposed to become a major funding organization for the
Internet community, but due to the ISOC's own financial problems this turned out to be
unrealistic. Notwithstanding that the ISOC was expected to establish links to external
organizations, it was not accepted as a representative speaker for the Internet community
as a whole. However, in December 1997, the ISOC's Board of Trustees could report a
stable relationship between the IETF and the ISOC, even though this was reached on the
IETF's, rather than on the ISOC's, terms. The ISOC's incorporation into the Internet
community is confirmed and declared by the fact that the ISOC's articles of incorporation
and by-laws have been published in the RFC-Series (see RFC 2134 and 2135 [April 97]).
Compared with its original aspiration, the ISOC only partly succeeded in getting
established in the organizational field of the Internet. This was a setback for the ISOC's
ambition to play a crucial role in the process of organizing global Internet governance as
a distinct set of rules and organizations vis-à-vis the organizational field of
telecommunications. Before we examine the ISOC's role at the interface of the two
organizational fields, we need to look at the internal structure and resources the
organization relies on.
5 Internal problems of the Internet society as a global organization
Corporate actor theory emphasizes the significance of the actor's constitution for its
potential to respond to and act on the outside environment. The ISOC's constitution
apparently does not provide a consistent structure that legitimates and empowers
organizational action effectively. When the ISOC was set up it was supposed to be an
organization with individual membership. Only later could corporate entities also become
members of the ISOC. However, the role of the individual vis-à-vis the corporate
members and the rights of the membership in general were ill-defined. The individual
members have the right to elect the Board of Trustees (BoT), the central executive body
of the society headed by a President, who is chief executive officer (CEO) at the same
time. No other formal means of directly shaping the ISOC's politics are provided in the
by-laws. Organizational members may designate a representative to the ISOC Advisory
Council, which provides advice and recommendations to the ISOC President and Board
of Trustees, but the Council does not seem to play an active role. This may be one reason
why the ISOC reports a high annual attrition rate.
Moreover, although the ISOC maintains that it operates not only through its BoT but also
through national and local chapters, the relation between the ISOC and these chapters is
ambiguous. For individuals and organizations committed to the Internet and to the ISOC
it is possible to set up chapters. All members of a chapter are at the same time members
of the ISOC, but not vice versa. While the ISOC, on the one hand, appears as an umbrella
organization with subordinate chapters, the chapters, on the other hand, define their own
purpose, focus on local issues and maintain no formal linkages to the ISOC (apart from
annual reports). To act as official chapters of the ISOC these units have to be recognized
by the BoT. The ISOC has set up model by-laws - partly with obligatory phrasing - and
guidelines for establishing a chapter. Chapters are funded by local membership(individual or organizational) and for that reason chapters can charge dues additional to
the ones paid to the ISOC. The chapter's scope may be local, regional or national, and
redundancy should be avoided.
For the time being, 45 chapters have been recognized and some 60 are in formation.
Some of them can be regarded as national chapters, for example the Norwegian, the
German or the Japanese chapter. The national chapters, however, have committed
themselves to different missions. Some see their central role in addressing national
political agencies and influencing the national political process; others put more weight
on providing services for the members. In Spain the ISOC chapters have emerged as
regional organizations in Andalucia, Catalonia etc. Four chapters have already been
recognized and another two are in formation.
Especially remarkable from the point of view of international coordination and regulation
of the Internet are two local chapters of the ISOC. One is located in Washington DC and
the other has its headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland. Setting up a chapter in Geneva was
no accident. Many international organizations have their home here. Geneva also hosts
European branches or headquarters of many multinational corporations. The Geneva
ISOC Chapter created a Special Interest Group on Development in order "to promote
Internet connectivity and awareness in developing countries". This group has a
membership "drawn from International Organizations such as ITU, WHO, CERN,
UNCTAD, ILO, IATA, UN-ECE, UN-DHA as well as from business and consulting
backgrounds" (cf. ISOC Forum Vol. 2, No. 11, 26 November 1996). The ISOC chapter in
Washington, as we read on its WWW home-page,[5] was formed "to meet unique needs
of Washington, DC-area Internet planners, builders, and users, and to help represent the
Internet to the U.S. government. The Internet Society itself (headquartered in nearby
Reston, VA), as a global organization, has encouraged creation of DC-ISOC to allow the
headquarters organization to maintain a global perspective, while the chapter meets the
pressing need for Internet representation in the U.S. government's work to define the
National Information Infrastructure (NII)."
The last two examples indicate that some kind of division of labor between the national
and local chapters and the ISOC is emerging, although this is more haphazard than
clearly and intentionally structured. The headquarter organization defines its role as an
actor at the global level in the concert of international organizations. However, the
headquarter organization is not the peak organization of an ISOC-federation, and the
Geneva chapter's Special Interest Group on Development, for example, works on its own
right rather than on the basis of competencies delegated from headquarters. It does not
formally report to headquarters either. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the ISOC
decided to set up an extra office for the permanent presence of the ISOC staff in Geneva.
The ISOC, we can summarize, is characterized by considerable internal ambiguity over its
constitution, but particularly its relation to national and local chapters. Some chapters
argue that a truly international ISOC would have to be governed by its constituent
chapters and therefore a national U.S. chapter should be formed. At INET 1998 (the
ISOC's annual conference), representatives of the chapters got together with the ISOC's
headquarter management to discuss their relationship and also how chapters in regional
areas should cooperate. The issue of regional cooperation came up after the European
chapters had met in Brussels with the European Commission. It remained unresolved.
While the ISOC enjoys a high degree of autonomy when it acts as a representative of its
global membership, its ill-defined internal structure makes it a weak organization with
little resources and therefore an unattractive ally for other organizations so far.6 The Internet Society between the telecommunications and the Internet
domain
In the eyes of many observers, the Internet complex has evolved as a decentralized
heterogeneous system with a loosely defined national or territorial identity. Its social
structure in a way mirrors the technical structure of the network of networks. The units
are loosely integrated in the system. They retain as much autonomy as possible without
this being detrimental to the links connecting the units. Organizations in this field interact
on a peer-to-peer basis rather than in a hierarchical mode. Power, control and authority is
distributed, and the system is open and responsive to bottom-up initiatives. Coordination
rather than regulation is the operating mechanism of this complex. This becomes apparent
if we look at the organizations which laid the technical foundation of the network. Not
only the IAB, the IETF and the IESG, but others too were traditionally guided by
professional and scientific, rather than political and economic, motives and values. The
withdrawal of U.S. government agencies from funding the coordination and
administration of the network has reinforced privatization and commercialization of the
Internet. Although commercial use of the Internet is regarded as legitimate and beneficial
to the network, deliberations of technical and operational matters are not meant to be
guided primarily by business concerns.
Some features of the Internet complex stand in sharp contrast to the organizational field
of telecommunications, which has inherited monopolistic or oligopolistic structures that
are subject to regulatory and anti-trust intervention in order to maintain competition and
prevent abuse based upon economic power (Kahin 1997). The users of
telecommunications networks and services still play a passive role, whereas the Internet is
more open to user participation. However, deregulation and liberalization of the
telecommunications markets have triggered structural changes of this organizational field
towards decentralization, greater competition and a globalization of network operators
and service providers. This development has also left its mark on the global landscape of
technical standardization, where many private consortia and forums have evolved which
co-exist with the official intergovernmental standardization organizations enjoying global
and regional significance.
In addition, technical changes have accelerated the convergence of the Internet with the
telephone network and the emergence of many new services. This has triggered a need
for new standards and collaboration between the organizational field of the Internet and
that of telecommunications. In this context it has become apparent that many
organizations in telecommunications have traditionally ignored the Internet or regarded it
as a transitory phenomenon. The majority of Internet standards have never been approved
as international standards, although the specifications have gained an international
significance and reputation on a scale parallel to the global expansion of the Internet. The
international standardization organizations, the ITU in particular, have refused to give
their approval because the Internet protocols provide a platform for a multitude of
standards which are functionally equivalent to, but not directly compatible with, the
standards developed by these organizations (Malamud 1993). This policy indicates that
powerful organizations in the telecommunications domain have tried to gain control over
the Internet and absorb its components.
The Internet community has been open and cooperative with regard to efforts aiming at
improving technical and organizational coordination with telecommunications. However,
it has not been clear who would represent the Internet at the international level. Early on,
the ISOC had an interest in filling this gap and acting as the representative of the Internetcommunity. This "mandate" would facilitate its acceptance as an important player in the
area of international standardization and technical coordination. The start was promising.
A first symbolic gesture indicated tentative international recognition. At its TELECOM
95 Forum in Geneva, for instance, the ITU organized a special Internet@TELECOM.95
conference with many companies representing the different facets of the Internet. At this
occasion Vinton Cerf, a co-inventor of the generic Internet protocol and a member of the
Board of Trustees of the ISOC, was awarded the ITU Medal by the ITU's Secretary
General, Pekka Tarjanne - an act of techno-political diplomacy. A short time later a
substantive step was made when a formal liaison was approved between the ISOC and
JTC1(the Joint Technical Committee of the ITU and the ISO) in the area of information
technology standards - another notable stage of recognition from the ISOC's point of
view. However, other formal links were established between the IETF - not the ISOC -
and several committees of regional and global standardization organizations. This was
welcomed by the Internet community, although not so much by the ISOC.
These developments mobilized the ISOC's CEO, who announced a more active role for
his organization in the future. In a press release of 1996 he declared that the ISOC aspired
to be placed "squarely at the forefront of some very key issues developing with regard to
Internet governance". In fact, if the Internet complex wanted to prevent being absorbed by
the telecommunications field it had to develop a stable governance structure which was
recognized internationally.
Thus, it was a logical consequence that the ISOC became involved in an international
inter-organizational committee charged with proposing a solution for restructuring the
Internet Domain Name System - one of the basic building blocks of the organizational
structure of the Internet. Initiated by the ISOC, an International Ad Hoc Committee
(IAHC) was formed in order to define, investigate and resolve issues arising from an
international debate over a proposal to establish global registries and additional generic
top level domain names (such as .com, for example). The most important reason for this
initiative was that the U.S. government had signaled it would terminate its financial
support of address and domain name administration. Contracts with the Internet Assigned
Numbers Authority (IANA) and other organizations involved in this area were not to be
renewed, it argued, and the privatized and commercialized Internet should become self-
supporting. While it is not our intention in the context of this paper to deal extensively
with the technical background and the regulatory and legal implications of the Internet's
domain name system, suffice it to say that it is remarkable that the IAHC was composed
not only of representatives of the Internet complex, including the Internet Architecture
Board (IAB), the ISOC and the IANA, but that it also included a representative of the
U.S. Federal Networking Council (FNC) and - more important with regard to the ISOC's
aspirations to become an international player - the ITU, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) and the International Trademark Association (INTA), i.e. three
well-established international organizations.
The IAHC was dissolved after the signing ceremony of a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) in Geneva on May 1, 1997. According to the MoU, which has since been signed
by more than 200 organizations from around the globe, the Secretary General of the ITU
was to act as the depository of the generic Top Level Domains. Seven new domains were
created and domain registration was planned as a competitive field with different,
commercially operating registrars. Representatives of the registrars formed the Council of
Registrars (CORE), and before its dissolution the IAHC appointed the first members of
an interim Policy Oversight Committee (POC), which was regarded as a central player in
this new structure. All organizations that participated in the IAHC were empowered toappoint members of the POC and influence the administration of the domains through the
POC. Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels (ACPs) were to be established to
resolve disputes over domains names, and the WIPO was chosen to administer the
procedures accompanying the disputes.
The ISOC took a leading role in the construction of this predominantly private regime for
governing the Internet. The idea behind the IAHC plan was to reinforce Internet self-
governance and at the same time include UN Treaty organizations to provide the Internet
with an international legal framework. However, the new system never took off. As the
U.S. government did not accept UN Treaty organizations getting involved in the
governance of the Internet, in particular the ITU with its traditionally tight links to the
former national PTT monopolies, it started to draft its own transition plan for the
withdrawal of government agencies from the Internet domain name and address
administration.
As a first step the Department of Commerce issued a Green Paper (Improvement of
Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses), the drawing up of which was
directed by its National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)
agency.[6] This paper meant a major setback to the Internet Society since the ISOC and
the IAHC plan were not mentioned at all. The NTIA emphasized private non-
governmental coordination as one principle of the new system. According to the Green
Paper, the functions of the IANA would be transferred to a new not-for-profit corporation
based in the U.S. and competition would be introduced not only at the level of the
registrars (which deal with the customers), but also at the level of registries (which run
the domain name/IP number databases). The role of the U.S. government would be
confined to participation in policy oversight during the transition period and would be
phased out by the end of September 2000. The successor to the IANA would be directed
by an international Board of Directors, in which inter alia Internet users would be
represented by a membership association, which according to the text had "to be created".
The NTIA received over 400 comments on the Green Paper, among them one from the
ISOC which stressed the principles of self-governance and the concept of "rough
consensus" that spearheaded the evolution of the Internet. It pointed out that there was no
need to reinvent the IANA, and expressed its discontent at not being recognized as the
organization of Internet users that it is, i.e. representative, international and open. The
U.S. government's response to the comments, however, gave no reason to expect that the
ISOC's position might be strengthened.
In a second paper, known as the White Paper (June 1998), the NTIA considered the
comments received on the Green Paper. The NTIA adhered to its plan to form a new
corporation for the coordination of core Internet functions. It stated that the private sector
should assume leadership and "that neither national governments acting as sovereigns nor
intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should
participate in management of Internet names and addresses." While the IAHC concept
followed the model of global coordination by intergovernmental arrangements, the NTIA
favored private arrangements akin to consortia and forums in international
standardization. The White Paper set up the framework for the new corporation, but
provided no definitive solutions. Although the ISOC participated in the discussions which
followed, its influence on the foundation of the new Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN) was slight. In the middle of 1999, the ISOC reviewed its
strategic plans and decided to concentrate on its role as an international and non-
governmental professional organization. The ISOC will continue to struggle for
recognition as both the membership association of Internet users and developers and amajor player in the concert of international organizations. However, in keeping with the
concept of organizational isomorphism, we surmise that the ISOC will have difficulties in
the future in placing itself at the intersection of two different organizational fields.
7 Conclusion
Liberalization and technical innovations in telecommunications have changed the
international regime of technical coordination and regulation including the landscape of
international standardization organizations. The incumbent intergovernmental or quasi-
intergovernmental organizations at the international and the regional level have been
complemented by a growing number of vendor-driven consortia and forums, which at the
same time represent a new model of standard-setting. The differences between the older
intergovernmental and the new private organizations notwithstanding, we find substantial
organizational similarity in the field of technical standardization in telecommunications
and related areas of information technology (Schmidt & Werle 1998: 58). Organizations
rather than individuals predominate. Individuals are regarded as "delegates" of the
organizations. Private units coexist and from time to time cooperate with (inter-
)governmental organizations. In principle, participation is open, but de facto it is
restricted to those organizations which are "substantially interested". The work is
committee-based, cooperative and consensus-oriented. It follows formalized rules and
procedures. Besides technical orientations, business interests guide the work.
Historically, the developments in this field coincided with the evolution of new
decentralized networks and services. Most spectacular was the evolution of the Internet,
which developed into a backbone of the information society and a commercially viable
global network. Standardization and technical coordination in the Internet context were
motivated both by businessand by scientific and professional objectives. The latter were
reinforced by the non-profit public-good tradition of the Internet. With regard to the
coordination of the Internet, an organizational field evolved which comprised these
elements, though it has not as yet reached a stable state.
One of the organizations which form the Internet complex is the Internet Society (ISOC),
which was set up at the time when U.S. government agencies began to disengage from
financially supporting the Internet. The ISOC's goal was to support and fund the
development and technical coordination of the Internet. The procedures of technical
coordination and standardization in the Internet community add much to the view that the
Internet represents a new paradigm of governance. As in telecommunications,
participation is voluntary, though it is more open to interested actors because there are
virtually no formal membership rules. Participants are seen as individuals and do not
represent organizations or companies. The work aims at achieving quick technical
solutions. Transparency of the working process is taken for granted. In contrast with
telecommunications, all documents are available online and for free.
When technical coordination and support of the Internet assumed an international
dimension, and increasingly overlapped and interfered with technical areas which were
traditionally controlled by actors outside the Internet complex, this provided opportunities
for the Internet Society as a corporate actor to establish itself as a player at the
international level of coordination of telecommunications and data networks. However,
the ISOC could not rely on strong organizational resources to take advantage of this
situation, because its internal constitution as a corporate actor remained ambiguous.
Neither the relation of the "headquarters" to the national and regional chapters nor therole of the individual and the corporate members of the ISOC are clearly defined.
Individual membership and the predominance of the individual over the collective have
been typical of the Internet community, whereas corporate membership and the priority of
corporate before individual interests characterize the telecommunications domain. The
ISOC has tried to integrate both elements under one roof and, in doing so, has
maneuvered itself into a somewhat marginal position with regard to both organizational
fields.
The ISOC's difficulties in establishing itself as a powerful connecting link between the
two organizational fields were aggravated by the general conflict over the role of private
organizations vis-à-vis intergovernmental arrangements in the international coordination
of technical networks. The transformation of Internet names and address management
touches upon this general problem. Initially, the ISOC managed to bring together groups
from the Internet complex and intergovernmental organizations to build a global regime
of technical coordination of the Internet. However, when the U.S. government intervened,
the ISOC was not strong enough to channel the national and international debate into a
direction favorable to the original governance model. Thus the process ended with the
formation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which appears
to be more in line with corporate interests than of benefit to the traditional Internet
community. This is not to say that the new private system has already reached a stable
state. Problems, such as the representation of the individual Internet user in the new
governance structure or the enforcement of rules in the Internet that developed from a
computer network for scientists to a universal infrastructure, remain to be solved. Some
observers suggest that in the long run the inclusion of the International
Telecommunication Union (or an equivalent body) in the governance of the Internet is
inevitable. Yet few expect that the ISOC will be needed to cope with the problems. Torn
between the two organizational fields and their different institutional structures, the ISOC
could well end up being pushed into a marginal role in both fields.
Endnotes
1 These functions have since been transferred to ICANN.
2 Professional objectives always played a significant role in standardization, besides
business interests and political interests. Many professional organizations are involved in
standardization at the national as well as the international level. The most prominent
professional association in this area is the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
(IEEE). IEEE is a transnational society with about 300,000 individual members in over
130 countries.
3 However, a change has been observed in recent years. Regarding the current
composition of the IAB, most members are U.S. residents working for the major
information technology companies. This indicates that some functions of the IAB with
regard to international coordination have been shifted to other organizations, particularly
the ISOC. At the same time we find that many of the Internet pioneers have switched
from the university and research area to business firms.
4 This is documented in RFC 2028 (Oct 96) entitled "The Organizations Involved in the
IETF Standards Process", which describes Internet standardization as "an organized
activity of the ISOC, with the Board of Trustees being responsible for ratifying the
procedures and rules of the Internet standards process". In RFC 2031 (Oct 96), which
deals exclusively with the "IETF-ISOC relationship", both organizations state clearly
"that ISOC has no influence whatsoever on the Internet Standards process, the InternetStandards or their technical content" and that the ISOC should restrict its involvement to
"provid[ing] a legal umbrella". Thus, the ISOC should not directly deal with technical
issues, but provide the legal shelter for Internet standardization. Accordingly, since
October 1997, each Request for Comments (beginning with RFC 2220) contains a
copyright statement, which acknowledges ISOC as copyright holder.
5 http://www.dcisoc.org/
6 The process is documented in some detail on the homepage of NTIA
(http://www.ntia.doc.gov).
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